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PLATONISM AND THE EXPOSITORY TREATISE ON THE SOUL (NHC II,6)
Lautaro Roig Lanzillotta
University of Groningen
It is no novelty to declare that a text from classical or Late Antiquity is in uen-
ced by Plato. At the beginning of the twentieth century, in a much repeated quote 
from his Gifford lectures at the University of Edinburgh, the philosopher Alfred 
Whitehead af rmed that ‘the safest characterization of the European philosophical 
tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato’1. 
Greek philosophical in uence has also been frequently acknowledged in the spe-
ci c context of Gnosticism. Tertullian makes reference to this in uence at the be-
ginning of the third century while criticizing his heterodox adversaries in De anima 
(23.1-5). With a hapax legomenon, namely condimentarium, he calls Plato the ‘ca-
terer to all the heretics’, thus critically pointing to the in uence of the philosopher 
of the Academy on Gnostic teachers such as Apelles or Valentinus2. Also in the third 
century, Hippolytus traced Basilides’ thought back to Aristotle. After describing the 
philosopher’s views on god, the soul and the  fth element (quinta essentia) as ‘obs-
cure and incomprehensible’, he explains Basilides’ thought through Aristotle, as if 
it is thanks to Basilides (obscurum per obscurius) that Hippolytus  nally came to 
understand Aristotle3.
However, such alleged in uences often have more to do with the expectations 
of readers than with the texts themselves. To begin with, the relationships a reader 
establishes between texts are highly dependent on his own background and what he 
knows or reads determines what he recognizes in other texts. The in uences are the-
refore never necessary and often subjective, and another reader might not recognize 
1 A. WHITEHEAD, Process and Reality (New York, 1957 [1929]) 53.
2 Tertullian, De anima 23.5, Doleo bona  de Platonem omnium hareticorum condimentarium factum.
3 Hippolytus, Refutatio VII, 15ff. See A.P. BOS, ‘Basilides: An Aristotelian Gnostic’, Vigiliae Chris-
tianae 54 (2000) 44–60.
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them. One may also be simply dealing with the fortuitous appearance or the uninten-
tional use of a given motif. 
However, even when its use and intention is clearly established, the appearance of 
a given motif is not enough to surmise the in uence of a given author, text or thinker 
on another text. In order to do so, the motif or theme should manifest itself within a 
clear conceptual framework that coincides with the general world-view of the alleged 
in uence, and if this is not the case we should at least be able to explain why this is so. 
This is especially applicable to cases of alleged Platonic in uences in Late Anti-
quity, a period in which Platonism had already become a kind of intellectual koine that 
extended its dominion far beyond the speci c sphere of philosophical schools. In fact, 
the Platonic approach to reality was ubiquitous and had reached a much wider public 
than was originally intended. For example, the soul-body distinction and the view of 
the later as a garment for the former, the opposition of the spiritual and the material 
and the higher valuation of the intangible, the notion of an inner being that is different 
from an external material one, the distinction between the heavenly and earthly realms, 
and many other elements appear everywhere: sometimes they are incorporated into the 
world-view of other philosophical schools and at other times they appear in literary 
works or are integrated into more or less popular religious texts of the period.
The caveats summarized above should therefore be taken into account before 
surmising alleged in uences on a text or before evaluating its tenor or the orientation 
of its thought. The widespread appearance of Platonic motifs in Late Antiquity, for 
example, may sometimes be deceptive, leading us to conclude that there is a Platonic 
in uence when in fact there is simply an echo of isolated motifs proceeding from the 
wider intellectual atmosphere in which the given text was composed. Where these 
motifs proceed from a more systematic in uence, however, we should be able to 
place them in the broader world-view of the text. 
I would like to exemplify this through the analysis of a Nag Hammadi text, The 
Expository Treatise on the Soul (ExSoul), a text which scholars generally label as 
Platonic. As we will see, in spite of its undeniable Platonic character, the text pre-
sents conceptual peculiarities that we must be able to explain before classing it as 
Platonic. The exposition is organized into three sections. The  rst provides an analy-
sis of ExSoul with a view to assessing the Platonic nature of the text. The second 
focuses on ExSoul’s allegorical interpretation of Gen 12:1, which is compared with 
Philo of Alexandria’s treatment of the same passage, revealing a rather different cos-
mological and anthropological background. Where do these differences come from? 
Given their divergences, can both texts still be considered Platonic? The third section 
offers some conclusions based on the previous analysis. 
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1. The Platonism of The Expository Treatise on the Soul
The Expository Treatise on the Soul is the sixth tractate of Nag Hammadi Codex 
24 in which we  nd a description both of the soul’s nature and origin and of its fate in 
the world of nature. ExSoul not only describes her fall into materiality (	)5, it 
also indicates the manner in which she may recover her pristine condition (
	).6 
Probably composed in Greek around 200 AD, the text presents a very negative view of 
the physical body and the world and, consequently, includes an exhortation to other-
worldliness, introducing frequent quotations from the OT and Homer7. 
The Soul’s Sojourn in the World and Eventual Liberation from the Bonds of Nature.
As the text begins, the soul appears to be lost in the world of nature. However, 
ExSoul is not entirely consistent regarding the causes that determined this exile on 
earth. The opening, for example, presents the soul as a victim, af rming that when 
she ‘fell down into a body and came to this life then she fell into the hands of many 
robbers’8. Even if this and other passages seem to imply that the soul is not respon-
sible for her present condition9, other sections seem to make her liable for her own 
fate10. Thus, for example, it is asserted that ‘many are the af ictions that have come 
4 There are numerous interesting commentaries and articles. See for example, W.C. ROBINSON, ‘The 
Exegesis on the Soul’, NT 12 (1970) 102–17; G.W. MACRAE, ‘A Nag Hammadi Treatise on the 
Soul’, in Ex orbe Religionum. Studia Geo Widengren oblata (Leiden, 1972) 471–79; J.-E. MÉNARD, 
‘L’Evangile selon Philippe et l’Exégese de l’âme’, in id. (ed.), Les textes de Nag Hammadi: col-
loque du Centre d’histoire des religions, Strasbourg, 23–25 octobre 1974 (Leiden, 1975) 56–81; 
H. BETHGE, ‘Die Exegese über die Seele ... eingeleitet und übersetzt vom Berliner Arbeitskreis für 
koptisch-gnostische Schriften’, Theologische Literaturzeitung 101 (1976) 93–104.
5 On the soul’s feminine nature see below section 1.2.
6 C. COLPE, ‘Die “Himmelsreise der Seele” ausserhalb und innerhalb der gnosis’, in U. BIANCHI (ed.), 
Le origini dello gnosticismo. Colloquio di Messina 13–18 aprile 1966 (Leiden, 1967) 429–447; J. 
HELDERMAN, ‘Anachorese zum Heil’, in MARTIN KRAUSE (ed.), Essays on the Nag Hammadi Texts in 
Honour of Pahor Labib (Leiden, 1975) 40–55.
7 On the use of quotations in ExSoul, see P. NAGEL, ‘Die Septuaginta-Zitate der koptisch-gnostischen 
“Exegese über die Seele” (Nag Hammadi Codex II)’, Archiv für Papyrusforschung und verwandte 
Gebiete 22/23 (1974) 249–69; R. McL. WILSON, ‘Old Testament Exegesis in the Gnostic Exegesis 
on the Soul’, in MARTIN KRAUSE (ed.), Essays on the Nag Hammadi Texts in Honour of Pahor Labib, 
217–24; M. SCOPELLO, ‘Les “Testimonia” dans le traité de ‘L’exégèse de l’âme (Nag Hammadi, II, 
6)’, Revue de l’histoire des religions 191 (1977) 159–71; ID., ‘Las citations d’Homère dans le Traité 
de L’Exégèse de l’âme’, in M. KRAUSE, Gnosis and Gnosticism (Leiden, 1977) 3–12. 
8 ExSoul 127,25–26.
9 ExSoul 127,22–128,1; 132,20.
10 ExSoul 128,35–129,5; 137,5.
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upon her because she abandoned her house’11 .
Admittedly, this lack of clarity is not surprising: ambiguity and contradictions are 
not uncommon in writers of this period when dealing with the descensus animae, 
the anthropological problem par excellence in Late Antiquity12. Indeed, if the soul 
was originally divine, how can we explain the fact that it now lives a degraded life 
in the realm of change, subject to de lement at ‘the hands of many robbers’ – to 
use the expression in ExSoul?13 In spite of the ambiguity concerning the causes that 
produced the fall, ExSoul is clear as to the very negative view both of the world and 
of the physical body. The text is explicit in its description of the soul’s suffering and 
exile in her earthly sojourn and in encouraging people to leave behind an existence 
depicted as a de lement and/or equivalent to prostitution. 
The lack of clarity disappears when we come to the ascent of the soul14. It con-
sists of three clear steps: the soul’s rejection of all that is not hers, namely the sorce-
ries of the external world, repentance for her former deeds, and reunion with her real 
husband. While the  rst two steps proceed from her own will and determination, the 
last depends exclusively on the Father’s external intervention. Only then does the 
soul regain its original condition.
Nature of the Soul
In explaining the soul’s present condition, the text remarks on the feminine name 
and nature of the soul. It is noteworthy that ExSoul even asserts that the soul has a 
womb15. This reference is essential for the conceptual and literary framework of the 
text, since the focus of the treatise is both the soul’s capacity to conceive and the fact 
that this capacity can result in either good or bad offspring according to the partners 
with whom she unites16. The idea is of Platonic provenance and seems to be inspired 
by Diotima’s speech in Plato’s Symposium17. Support for this hypothesis comes from 
11 ExSoul 129,4–5.
12 A.J. FESTUGIÈRE, Doctrines de l’âme (Paris, 1953) 63–118. See also J. DILLON, ‘The Descent of the 




15 ExSoul 127,19–22. On the motif, see A.A. BARB, ‘Diva Matrix. A Faked Intaglio in the Possession 
of P.P. Rubens and the Iconology of the Symbol’, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institute 
16 (1953) 193–214.
16 ExSoul 134,2–3, good offspring; 128,23–26, bad offspring.
17 In spite of A.D. NOCK and A.J. FESTUGIÈRE, Corpus Hermeticum I: Traités I–XII (Paris, 21960) 101, 
note 9, who consider the idea of the soul’s good or bad offspring to be a combination of Oriental and 
Platonic elements, we agree with B. Layton that it is clearly Platonic and that it can be explained on 
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the text’s assertion, later on, that the soul’s womb is ‘around the outside like the male 
genitalia, which are external’,18 which recalls Aristophanes’ speech in the same Pla-
tonic dialogue that describes Zeus’ division of the originally androgynous humans 
into two halves as a punishment for human pride19. 
ExSoul relates that although virgin and androgynous in origin20, the soul lost this 
pristine condition as a result of incarnation, when ‘some made use of her [by for-
ce], while others did so by seducing her with a gift’21. How should we explain this 
statement? According to some scholars it is a reference to sexuality as ‘the soul’s 
plight’22. In their view, the sexual metaphor is not a metaphor at all, but a description 
of the actual state of the soul within a body and its consequent promiscuity. In my 
view, however, the context makes this interpretation hardly tenable, since we are still 
moving exclusively in the sphere of the soul: to this point there is no reference to the 
body at all. How could the text refer to sexuality? The text cannot be describing the 
latter’s prostitution but something else. 
The ‘Prostitution’ of the Soul
Given that we are still in the context of the soul, in spite of the sexual imagery 
the simile of the prostitution of the soul should be seen as a metaphorical descrip-
tion of her interaction with the sensible world. There are both irrational and rational 
elements involved in this exchange: those who ‘made use of her by force’ refers to 
the senses and sensory perception. The simile is effective – due to the soul’s union 
with the body, the continuous in ux of information conveyed by the senses creates 
a delusionary conception of the external world. Conversely, those that ‘seduce her 
with a gift ()’ represent the rational elements, namely the attraction of exter-
nals, since they imply the soul’s assent to what comes from without. This seems a 
clear reference to the passions of the soul: on the one hand, the motif of the soul’s 
seduction by means of a gift – and, particularly, the term used for the latter () – 
appears recurrently in contexts dealing with the soul’s involvement in the delusion of 
the exclusive basis of Plato. A close reading of Diotoma’s speech in the Symposium (201D–212B) 
shows that the idea might indeed proceed from this dialogue.
18 ExSoul 131,25–26.
19 Plato, Symposium 189C–193E. See KULAWIK, Die Erzählung, 285–88, who denounces previous 
scholarship’s neglect of the parallel and provides an interesting commentary on both ExSoul and 
Plato’s Symposium that claims an in uence of the latter on the former (in my view unnecessarily) 
through Philo of Alexandria; ibid., 285 note 45.
20 A similar conception can be found in AuthTeach 25.6–9, which describes the soul’s contact with the 
world and the subsequent appearance of desires as a ‘contamination’ of man’s virginity: ‘For if a 
thought of lust enters into a virgin man, he has already become contaminated’.
21 ExSoul 127,29–31.
22 See for example, SCOPELLO, L’Exégèse, 58–59; ROBINSON, ‘The Expository Treatise’, 137–38. 
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externals23. On the other hand, according to the Platonic bipartition of the soul which 
was standard during this period, it is the rational part of the soul that must keep control 
over the affections that may seduce the irrational part with their ephemeral satisfaction.
Support for this interpretation comes from another Nag Hammadi text, the Au-
thoritative Teaching (AuthTeach), a text in which this peculiar combination of irra-
tional and rational elements also determines the prostitution of the soul24. Not only 
is the soul-body relationship seen as unnatural, but the soul’s sojourn in the body, the 
‘house of poverty’, is also conceived of as an illness25. More interesting is the way 
in which the world’s in uence on the soul is described, since it presents conspicu-
ous similarities to ExSoul. To begin with, it is said that the world ‘blows at her (the 
soul’s) eyes wishing to make her blind’, by means of which reality imposes itself on 
the senses. Irrational as it is, the only antidote to the violence of sensory perception is 
	 or ‘reason’, which works as a medicine in order that the soul may really see26. 
However, AuthTeach also refers to another kind of in uence on the soul, which acts 
on her by means of persuasion – namely the passions. The interesting simile of the 
 sherman27 provides an explanation of how violence and persuasion work on the 
soul:  rstly, the adversary puts a variety of foods () with appealing form and 
smell in front of us, concealing within them a hook in order to seize and subdue 
us by force ()28: ‘Now all such things the adversary prepares beautifully and 
spreads out before the body, wishing to make the mind of the soul incline her toward 
one of them and overwhelm her, like a hook, drawing her by force ...’. Once this 
deluding view has established itself in the soul, passions arise within it as a logical 
consequence29: appearances continue ‘deceiving her (the soul) until she conceives 
evil, and bears fruit of matter, and conducts herself in uncleanness, pursuing many 
desires, covetousness, while  eshly pleasure draws her in ignorance’.
23 The combination of force and seduction appears recurrently in texts dealing with the deception of 
the soul in the realm of nature. In this context, ‘violence’ () and the deceptive ‘present’ () 
are also frequently used to describe the effect of externalities on man. Thus, for example, Acta An-
dreae (AA) describes the devil’s seduction of humanity by means of the term ‘presents’ (, 18 
[Vr 252; 256]) and implicitly associates 	 ‘life’ and  ‘violence’ (AA 17 [Vr 231–33]). The same 
combination can be found in TrimProt (NHC XIII,1) 144,12–13; Gosphil (NHC II,3) 65,16–18 and, 
as SCOPELLO, L’Éxegèse, 122, points out, Longus, Daphnis and Chloe XV,1.
24 AuthTeach 24.6–10, a text which, in spite of its lacunary character, clearly describes the soul’s deal-
ing with the world as prostitution.
25 AuthTeach 27.25–27.
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The continuation of the ExSoul plastically describes this never-ending search for 
the ephemeral ful lment of the passions. The soul is depicted as having sexual in-
tercourse with various adulterers, who abandon her as soon as they have used her 
without giving her what she expected to receive from them: ‘but even when she turns 
her face from those adulterers, she runs to others and they compel her to live with 
them and to render service to them upon their bed, as if they were her masters ... and 
after all they abandon her and go’30.
The Biblical quotations introduced to exemplify the prostitution of the soul also show 
that we are moving exclusively in the realm of the soul’s alienation and not in that of sexu-
ality. After quoting Jeremiah (3:1-4) and Hosea (2:4-9), ExSoul introduces a quote from 
Ezekiel (16:23-26). The allegorical interpretation of the latter provides support for my 
interpretation of the sexual simile as a metaphorical description of the soul’s dealings with 
externalities. As a matter of fact, ExSoul explains Ezekiel 16:26 (‘You prostituted yourself 
to the sons of Egypt, those who are your neighbors, men great of  esh’) as follows:
But what does ‘the sons of Egypt, men great of  esh’ mean if not the do-
main of the  esh and the perceptible realm and the affairs of the earth, by 
which the soul has become de led here, receiving bread from them, as well as 
wine, oil, clothing and the other external nonsense surrounding the body––the 
things she thinks she needs31. 
It is interesting that according to Hippolytus the Peratae applied a very similar alle-
gorical interpretation. In it one  nds again a close association of Egypt with the body: 
All, however, who are ignorant, are, according to Peratic exegesis, Egyp-
tians. And this, they assert, is the departure from Egypt, (that is,) from the 
body. For they suppose Egypt to be body, and that it crosses the Red Sea— 
that is, the water of corruption, which is Cronus— and that it reaches a place 
beyond the Red Sea, that is, generation; and that it comes into the wilderness, 
that is, that it attains a condition independent of generation32. 
The simile was also used by the Naassens, who even more clearly held Egypt 
to be an image for the ‘lower mixis’, for the lower realm of generation, namely the 
realm of the body and the  esh33.
That we are dealing here with an allegorical interpretation of the Biblical pas-
sage by means of Platonic dualism seems evident, since we  nd it also in Philo of 
30 ExSoul 128,7–17; see also 131,13–16.
31 ExSoul 130,20–23. The same allegorical interpretation is given by Philo, De Migr. 14; see below.
32 Hippolytus, Ref. V 16,5.
33 Hippolytus, Ref. V 7,39–40. See M. Tardieu, Trois Mythes. Adam Éros et les animaux d’Égypte 
dans un écrit de Nag Hammadi (Paris, 1974) 270–71.
352 LAUTARO ROIG LANZILLOTTA
Alexandria34, who interprets Genesis by means of the Timaeus and Exodus, applying 
the same opposition of the visible world and the world of ideas. According to Philo, 
everyone should engage in ‘taking out all the population of the soul right away from 
Egypt, the body, and away from its inhabitants; deeming it a most sore and heavy 
burden that an understanding endowed with vision should be under the pressure of 
the pleasures of the  esh ...’35. Through Philo this allegory came to Clement of Al-
exandria, who saw in Egypt ‘a symbol for the world and of error, the passions and 
vices’36 and Origen, who according to an already widespread exegetical allegory 
calls Egypt 	 	, the ‘place of slavery’37.
However, it is the text itself that con rms the interpretation of the soul’s violation 
and prostitution as a reference to the in uence of both sensory perception and emo-
tions. The following NT quotations leave no doubt about this38, with ExSoul af rm-
ing that when the apostles command that you ‘guard yourselves against it’39 they are 
‘speaking not just of the prostitution of the body but especially of that of the soul’40 
According to ExSoul, it is not the body that is held responsible for the bad conduct 
of the soul, but the soul for the bad conduct of the body. In a way which recalls the 
pre-Socratic view of Democritus, the text asserts that ‘the greatest [struggle] has to 
do with the prostitution of the soul. From it arises the prostitution of the body as 
well’41. It seems clear, consequently, that the preceding section is concerned with the 
symbolic violation or prostitution of the soul, namely her degradation in the world of 
nature due to the in uence of the senses and the passions.
34 Philo of Alexandria, De migratione Abrahami 14–15; Moses I 18–29, on which see S.J.K. Pearce, 
‘King Moses: Notes on Philo’s Portrait of Moses as an Ideal Leader in the Life of Moses’, in Mé-
langes de l’Université Saint-Joseph 57 (2004) 37–74 at 50–55; see also Leg. III 13–14; Conf. 92.
35 Philo of Alexandria, Migr. 14; on which see S.J.K. Pearce, The Land of the Body: Studies in Philo’s 
Representation of Egypt (Tübingen, 2007) 120–122; see also ibid. 127, ‘Departure of Egypt, the 
body, is always associated with the moral or spiritual progress away from the body and the things 
of the body. Arriving in Egypt represents the soul in danger, subject to assault, imprisonment or 
enslavement by the bodily passions’.
36 Clement of Alexandria, Strom. II 47.1; I 30.4.
37 Origen, In Ex. VIII, 2. Numerous references in Tardieu, Trois Mythes, 270 note 350.
38 Acts 15:20; 1 Cor 5:9–10 and Eph. 6:12.
39 With reference to the following places: Acts 15:20, 29; 21:25; 1 Thess 4:3; 1Cor 6:18; 2Cor 7:1.
40 ExSoul 130,32–33.
41 ExSoul 130,35–131,2; cf. Democritus B 159 D-K: ‘If the body brought a suit against it [i.e., the soul] 
for all the sufferings and ills it had endured throughout its whole life, and one had oneself to judge 
the case, one would gladly condemn the soul for having ruined certain features of the body through 
carelessness and made it soft through drink and brought it to rack and ruin through love of pleasure, 
just as if a tool or a utensil were in a bad state one would blame the person who used it carelessly’.
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In spite of their different modes of action, whether by force or seduction, the 
in uence of the ‘adulterers’ on the soul is comparable, ‘her offspring by the adul-
terers are dumb, blind, and sickly. They are feebleminded’42. As stated above and 
in line with Diotima’s speech in Plato’s Symposium, the main objective of the text 
is to convey the idea that when the soul mixes with bad partners due to the wrong 
inclination, she necessarily produces bad offspring. By her contact with the world, 
through the in uence of the body, the soul not only creates her own delusional cap-
tivity (!), but also prolongs it due to her obliviousness to her own origin. 
Conversely, when mixing with good partners the result can only be positive. 
The Soul’s Salvation
Thanks to the mercy of the Father, however, not everything is lost. The last part of 
the narrative section explains that when the soul repents after suffering and disgrace 
she gains the grace of the Father:
But when the father who is above visits her and looks down upon her and 
sees her sighing ... and repenting of the prostitution in which she engaged, and 
when she begins to call upon his name ... then he will count her worthy of his 
mercy upon her ...43
The process of spiritual recovery enacted by the Father also begins with a sort of phy-
sical puri cation which counteracts the physical contamination produced by the soul’s 
contact with the world. The Father  rst moves the womb from the external to the internal 
domain, thus cutting off, in a manner of speaking, the possibility of new in uences from 
the exterior. Once this has been done, he cleanses the soul of all pollution44:
So when the womb of the soul, by the will of the father, turns itself inward, 
it is baptized and is immediately cleansed of external pollution, which was 
pressed upon it, just as [garments, when] dirty, are put into the [water and] 
turned about until their dirt is removed and they become clean45. 
I cannot agree with Bentley Layton’s interpretation of the passage in terms of the 
motif of the soul as a dirty garment46. Thus far ExSoul has maintained a clear dualis-
tic view of the world and man, opposing the divine and earthly realms and body and 
soul, respectively. In such a Platonic, dualistic context, the motif of the garment is 
42 ExSoul 128,23–26.
43 ExSoul 128,26–129,4.
44 See F. WISSE, ‘On Exegeting the “Exegesis on the Soul”’, in J.E. MÉNARD, Les Textes de Nag 
Hammadi. Colloque du Centre d’Histoire des religions, Strassbourg, 23–25 octobre 1974 (Leiden, 
1975) 68–81 at 73–74.
45 ExSoul 131,27–34.
46 B. LAYTON, ‘The Soul as a Dirty Garment’, Le Muséon 91 (1978) 155–69.
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strictly applied to the body and not to the soul47. In Hermetic and Gnostic contexts, 
the Platonic motif was adapted and applied to the soul, but this exclusively occurs 
in trichotomous schemes that distinguish body, soul and intellect and/or pneuma48. 
According to this well-documented view, after physical death the soul leaves the 
body in order to ascend to the celestial region. It is in that region that the intellect 
‘puts off’ its psychic garment in order to continue its ascent to its fatherland49. 
After the  rst step towards the soul’s recovery of her former nature (132,1), 
so plastically and physically described in terms of the Father turning her womb 
inward, the restitution of the soul’s pristine condition consists in regaining her for-
mer state of androgyny through the reunion with her other half. This reunion is 
presented as a marriage, the soul being the bride and the other half the bridegroom. 
The soul has forgotten what the bridegroom looked like at ‘the time she fell from 
her father’s house’, ‘[b]ut then the bridegroom, according to the father’s will, came 
down to her into the bridal chamber, which was prepared. And he decorated the 
bridal chamber’50. The soul then begins to gradually recognize her other half ‘and 
[once] they unite [with one another], they become a single life’51. 
Both context and vocabulary seem to place us in a clear Gnostic framework52. 
As a matter of fact, the Gospel of Philip, another Nag Hammadi text, abounds with 
references to the opposition of ‘ eshly wedding’ and ‘spiritual wedding’53 and in-
cludes numerous references to the ‘bridal chamber’54, as is also the case in the 
Gospel of Thomas55. As Marvin Meyer and Gerard Luttikhuizen have pointed out, 
47 See Plato, Gorgias, 523ff; see also Empedocles B 126 D-K.
48 Clement of Alexandria, Exc. Theod. 64 (see also 61.8; 63.1), describes souls as "#. See NOCK-
FESTUGIÈRE, Corpus Hermeticum I, 131 note 57. According to E.R. DODDS, Proclus. The Elements of 
Theology (Oxford, 1963 [1933]) 307, the metaphor has an Orphic-Pythagorean origin (see the pas-
sages of Empedocles and Plato referred to in the previous note) and conceives of the body as a garment 
(
) which souls takes off after death. In his view, the Valentinian interpretation of Gen. 3.21 
and the ‘coat of skin’ ($ 	) as a reference to the  eshly body has the same background (cf. 
Irenaeus, Adv. haer 1.5.5); see also CH VII 18 and NOCK-FESTUGIÈRE, ad loc., Corpus I, 82–83 note 9.
49 CH X 16; Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. 1.7.1 and 1.21.5 (Marcosians).
50 ExSoul 132,23–26.
51 ExSoul 132,34–35.
52 For the Gnostic interpretation of the whole section, see Scopello, L’Exegèse, 141. 
53 GosPhil (NHC II,3) 64.35–65.1; 76.6–9; 82.4–10.
54 GosPhil (NHC II,3) 70.13–20.
55 GosThom (NHC II,2) 75. Sevrin, L’Éxegèse, 101–102, rightly points out that in ExSoul the ‘bridal 
chamber’ does not refer, as is usual in Gnostic texts, to the Pleroma, since in ExSoul the bridegroom 
descends to meet the bride. See also J.M. SEVRIN, ‘Les noces spirituelles dans l’Evangile selon 
Philippe’, Le Muséon 87 (1974) 143–93 at 188–191.
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however, the passage should be placed in its wider Hellenistic context56. Even Philo 
of Alexandria provides some precedent both for the idea of spiritual marriage and 
for its goal: superseding all aspects associated with femaleness to reach the higher 
status of male rationality57.
The Soul’s Departure from the World of Nature
In this context ExSoul introduces a quote from Gen 12:1, in which God com-
mands Abraham to leave his country, his kinsmen and the house of his father, with 
the treatise stating that her heavenly bridegroom ‘requires her to turn her face from 
her people and her adulterers’. After quoting Psalm 44:11-12, which already advan-
ces the notions of the soul’s ‘people’ and ‘father’, ExSoul quotes Gen 12:1 in order 
to encourage people to depart from the delusion and  ux of the tangible world. In the 
context of the treatise, however, the use of both quotations is somewhat confusing, 
since up to this point ‘the soul’s father’ was the real father, namely God, and the 
‘house of her father’, the divine realm. Thus, for example, ExSoul 132,20 refers to 
the soul’s obliviousness to her origin with the following words: ‘(the soul) no longer 
remembers the time she fell from her father’s house (phei mpeeivt)’. In contrast, 
Psalm 44:11 advises the soul to ‘forget your people and your father’s house’.
Due to the  agrant contradiction, the author is forced to introduce a gloss to qua-
lify his quoting of Gen 12:1. Firstly, he associates ‘her people’ with the ‘multitude of 
her adulterers’ and then he states that the ‘father’ mentioned in Psalm 44:11-12 is not 
the real father – namely the celestial father to whom the soul actually belongs and 
should return to – but the ‘earthly father’:
For he requires her to turn her face from her people and the multitude of 
her adulterers, in whose midst she once was, to devote herself only to her king, 
her real lord, and to forget the house of the earthly father, with whom things 
went badly for her, but to remember her father, who is in heaven58.
However, this reference creates some new conceptual problems, since the author 
introduces a duality of fathers not mentioned thus far. Some scholars interpret this 
as a reference to the Demiurge or creator god59. In my view, however, this is hardly 
56 KULAWIK, Die Erzählung, 186.
57 See Philo of Alexandria, Quaest. in Ex. 1.7–8; Fuga et Inv. 51; on which see M. MEYER, ‘Making 
Mary Male: The Categories “Male” and “Female” in the Gospel of Thomas’, New Testament Stud-
ies 31 (1985) 554–70 at 563–64; G.P. LUTTIKHUIZEN, De Veelvormigheid van het vroegste Christen-
dom (Delft, 2002) 175 note 320.
58 ExSoul 133,20–28.
59 See SCOPELLO, L’Exegèse, 144; and, with hesitation, SEVRIN, L’Exegèse, 106, who points out that 
even if not openly presented as the Demiurge, the description ‘earthly father’ in the present dualistic 
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necessary. Firstly, this is the only reference in the ExSoul to an earthly father; and se-
condly, the reference can be perfectly explained on the basis of the confusing textual 
context created by the introduction of both quotations60.
In any case and as a con rmation of the previous gloss, ExSoul then introduces 
God’s commandment to Abraham in Gen 12:1:
Come out from your country and your kinsfold
And from your father’s house61
In the dualistic context of ExSoul the reference to Gen 12:1, which includes three 
elements and not two, remains somewhat arti cial. It is noteworthy that no effort is 
made to explain the third element, namely the ‘country’ referred to in the quote. In 
the following section we will see that Philo’s use of the quotations reveals another 
kind of Platonism to that implied by ExSoul.
Once bride and bridegroom  nally reunite ‘she had intercourse with him, she 
got from him the seed that is the life-giving spirit, so that by him she bears good 
children’62. This is clearly the counterpoint to the beginning of the text. While her 
interaction with bad partners made her a slave of circumstances, either by force or by 
seduction, a captive in the prison of external delusion, the reunion with her other half 
provides her the life-giving pneuma that assures her of good offspring. Once ratio-
nality is fully restored to the soul, the rational part retakes complete control over the 
soul’s conglomerate: no longer subdued by force or seduction, she is freed from the 
pressure of externals. The soul now moves of her own accord and is restored to her 
original abode. As the text expressively af rms: ‘This is the ransom from captivity. 
This is the upward journey to heaven’63.
2. Philo’s use of Gen 12:1 and its Philosophical Background
Even though numerous exegetes point to Philo’s allegorical interpretation of Gen 
12:1 as parallel to the use of the quote in ExSoul, a closer analysis immediately shows 
that the similarities only concern general issues, namely the allegorical interpretation 
of the ‘migration’. As we will now have the opportunity to see, we face rather different 
Gnostic context implicitly calls for associations with it. See, however, KULAWIK, Die Erzählung 
über die Seele, who rightly points out that this only mention is not suf cient in order to surmise an 
implicit reference to the Demiurge.
60 Also noted by SEVRIN, L’Éxegèse, 106, who rightly denounces the confusing context created by the 
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anthropological conceptions: whereas ExSoul is straightforward in its bipartite concep-
tion of the human, Philo’s point of departure is somewhat more complex.
Philo in general endorses the Platonic anthropological model, namely a bipartite 
scheme that opposes the soul to the body, as the interior and exterior dimensions of 
man64. However, as usual in Hellenism, he also tends to differentiate rational and irra-
tional parts within the soul, in this way opening up the path to a trichotomous view 
of man65. An example of this attitude appears at the beginning of his De migratione 
Abrahami. Philo opens the text with a quotation from Gen 12:1-3 and devotes the 
subsequent chapters to providing a sound explanation of the three elements involved 
in God’s commandment to Abraham. In fact his allegorical interpretation clearly diffe-
rentiates three parts in man (body, soul and logos): ‘“Land” or “country” is a symbol of 
the body, “kindred” of sense-perception, “father’s house” of speech (logos)’66.
His tendency towards trichotomy is even clearer as the text advances, namely in 
chapters 9, 10 and 12-13 of De migratione. The commandment to Abraham is ex-
plicitly rendered there as: ‘Escape … from the prison-house, thy body’ (9); ‘Depart 
… out of sense-perception’ (10); and ‘again, quit speech also’ (12), which becomes 
even clearer in the next chapter, since the ambiguous term logos is substituted now 
by nous: ‘… when Mind (nous) begins to know itself and to hold converse with the 
things of mind, it will thrust away from it that part of the soul which inclines to the 
province of sense perception’67.
While in De migratione we thus observe both the internal bipartition of the soul 
and a reference to its rational part with the term ‘Mind’ (	), the function of which 
64 Philo, Leg. alleg. 3.62; Cher. 128; Det. Pot. Ins. 19; Agric., 46 and 152; cf. Abr., 96 etc.
65 This is in line with the views developed by Plato in the Republic and the Timaeus. Against the 
view expressed in the Phaedo (783b-c) that the soul is not ‘composite’ – and therefore not liable 
to destruction – the Republic af rms that the soul has three parts: the spirited, the irrational and 
the rational. As DÖRRIE (Porphyrios, 167–68) has pointed out, however, Middle Platonists reduced 
the former two to a single part in order to bring it into line with the bipartition irrational-rational in 
the Timaeus. On the bipartite structure of the soul in Middle-Platonism, see DILLON, The Middle-
Platonists, 101–02 (Antiochus of Ascalon), 174–75 (Philo), 194 (Plutarch), 256–57 (Atticus), 263 
(Severus), 290–94 (Alcinous). 
66 Philo of Alexandria, De migr. Abr. 2.5–7. Even if, at  rst sight, the tripartite conception might seem to 
be forced by the three elements mentioned in Gen 12:1, the logos is nevertheless clearly seen as a dif-
ferentiated part of the soul – witness his assertion, some lines below, that discursivity (dianoia) is the 
rational part of the soul as opposed to the irrational part that rules over sensation: see De migr. Abr. 3.4–5, 
%'	 * *	 + 
< " =	, > @	, "Q\ ^	 >! _' `@	 {.
67 Philo of Alexandria, De migr. Abr. 13.4–5, "Q| { } {	 >~' !=  + 	 
'	 " !, Q  < @	 `@	 Q	  ' 	 
Q. 
See also Philo, Quis heres 69–74, where he expounds his view of ecstatic experience, conceived of 
as the act by means of which the mind leaves itself.
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is described as controlling the irrational part, De Abrahamo includes a reference to the 
capacity of Mind to detach itself both from irrationality and the body. The section in 
question from De Abrahamo also refers to Gen 12. After devoting a long section to an 
exposition of both the literal and allegorical interpretations of Gen 12:1, Philo conclu-
des that according to the allegorical explanation the passage shows ‘how the mind did 
not remain for ever deceived nor stand rooted in the realm of sense, nor suppose that 
the visible world was the Almighty and Primal God, but using its reason sped upwards 
and turned its gaze upon the intelligible order which is superior to the visible’68.
Even though Philo does not necessarily depart from the Platonic bipartite sche-
me, we see a tendency to make the {	 increasingly independent69. Are we dealing 
with an Aristotelian in uence on the commonly inherited Platonic view? On the 
basis of Quis Heres 277ff. one might provide a positive answer to this question. In 
this passage Philo attempts to provide a sound explanation of the term ‘fathers’ in 
the context of Gen 15:15 – in which the command is opposite to that in Gen 12:1, 
namely ‘Depart to thy fathers’. In this context Philo is interested in clarifying what 
Moses meant by ‘fathers’ in Gen 15 and in allegorically explaining the passage he 
offers three possible (usual?) explanations of the term ‘fathers’, which in my view 
have Peripatetic, Platonic and Stoic backgrounds, respectively. 
To begin with he refers to the view of those who interpret ‘fathers’ as the sun, the 
moon and other stars, since in this conception ‘it is owing to these bodies that the 
nature of all the things in the world has its existence’ (280; 283). Some interpret this 
section as a reference to astral determinism and connect it with De Abrahamo 69, 
in which Philo attacks this view70. However, both the content and the framework of 
the statement also seem to point rather to an Aristotelian or Peripatetic provenance. 
Philo reports that according to this view the totality of the visible world owes its 
existence (	 is the term used by Philo) to the stars or astral spheres, as Aristotle 
asserts in Coming-to-be and passing-away71. Secondly, Philo refers to the interpre-
tation of ‘fathers’ as the archetypal forms on which earthly things are modelled. The 
third view deals with the Stoic conception, in which man is a combination of the four 
68 Philo of Alexandria, De Abr. 62–88 at 88.
69 On Aristotle, see A.P. BOS, ‘Aristotelian and Platonic Dualism in Hellenistic and Early Christian 
Philosophy and Gnosticism’, Vigiliae Christianae 56 (2002) 273–291 at 276–277 and the bibliog-
raphy quoted in notes 13–15.
70 See M. HARL, Quis rerum divinarum heres sit. Introduction, traduction et notes (Paris, 1966) 307, 
who refers to Quaest. Ex. II 114 and De migr. 97; see other similar passages in A.J. FESTUGIÈRE, La 
Révélation d’Hermes Trismégiste II, 569–72; see also De Abrahamo 69, on which see A.P. BOS, ‘De 
wijsgerige theologie van Philo van Alexandrië als wegbereidster van gnostische theologieën’, Kerk 
en theologie 51 (2000) 52–63 at 57–58.
71 Aristotle, De gen. et corr. II 10–11; see his conclusion at 338A 4–338B 7; Cf. Physics VIII 7–9.
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elements and will thus return to them after death. The Stoic provenance of the notion 
is not only to be seen in the emphasis on the four elements, but also in the fact that 
Philo introduces the simile of grammar: as nouns and verbs ‘consist of the elements 
of grammar, and again are resolvable into these ultimate principles’72, so each indi-
vidual returns his constituting elements to the four ground elements73. 
Philo closes this survey of interpretive approaches with another reference to Aristotle, 
this time as support for the view that the soul is made out of the same element as the stars. 
Indeed, in a passage including some echoes of De coelo (I.1-2), Philo af rms that there is 
‘a  fth substance, moving in a circle, differing by its superior quality from the four. Out 
of this they thought the stars and the whole of heaven had been made and deduced as a 
natural consequence that the human soul also was a fragment thereof’74. As a matter of 
fact, Philo’s knowledge and use of Aristotle is so frequent that a recent article by a Dutch 
scholar calls him ‘a Platonist in the image and the likeness of Aristotle’75. 
3. Conclusions
We might conclude that there is no doubt about the Platonic background of the 
text. With Layton we af rm the banality of certain Platonic motifs, which were al-
ready part of the Platonic koine of the period76, such as the distinction between the 
heavenly and earthly realms and the fall of the soul into a body. There are other ele-
ments, however, which may not be considered to be so trivial:
To begin with, there is the reference to the soul’s vulnerability to moral and, the-
reby, ontological degradation. In spite of the lack of clarity regarding the cause of the 
fall, the text includes a version of the known Platonic descensus animae (127,25-26).
72 Philo of Alexandria, Quis heres 282. On the Stoics on grammar, see M. POHLENZ, Die Begründung 
der abendlandischen Sprachlehere durch die Stoa, Nachrichten von der Gesselschaft der Wissen-
schaften zu Göttingen 3.6 (1939); R.H. ROBINS, Ancient and Mediaeval Grammatical Theory in 
Europe, with Particular Reference to Modern Linguistic Doctrine (London, 1951) and ID., A Short 
History of Linguistics (London/New York, 31990) 11–47; M. FREDE, ‘The rigins of raditional 
Grammar’, in R.E. BUTTS and J. HINTIKKA (eds.), Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Log-
ic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht, 1977) 51–79 [Reprinted in M. FREDE, 
Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Oxford, 1987) 338–359] and ‘Principles of Stoic Grammar’, in J.M. 
RIST (ed.), The Stoics (Berkeley, 1978) 27–75.
73 Philo of Alexandria, Op. 136; 146. See B.A. PEARSON, ‘Philo and Gnosticism’, ANRW II 21.1 (1984) 
295–343 at 338.
74 Philo of Alexandria, Quis heres 283; on which see P. MORAUX, ‘Une nouvelle trace de l’Aristote 
perdu’, Études Class. 16 (1948) 89–91; see A.P. BOS, The Soul and Its Instrumental Body, 280–81.
75 A.P. BOS, ‘Philo of Alexandria: a Platonist in the Image and the Likeness of Aristotle’, The Studia 
Philonica Annual 10 (1998) 66–86.
76 LAYTON, ‘Dirty Garment’, 163.
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Central in the text is the idea that the soul produces good or bad offspring according 
to her partners, which might have its origin in Diotima’s speech in Plato’s Symposium.
Clearly Platonic is the idea that the soul is numb under the pressure of externals 
and that when freed from external impediments she moves of her own accord (134,4-
9), as Plato’s Phaedrus af rms77.
The bipartition of the soul into rational and irrational parts.
There are also the ideas of repentance and conversion.
Finally, there is the quotation of the same passage of the Odyssey as Plotinus. The 
association, in ExSoul, of Calypso with the delusion of externals and of Odysseus’ 
home with the soul’s fatherland runs parallel with that of Plotinus in the Enneads.
Admittedly, these aspects could be labelled as being generally Platonic. Certain ele-
ments, however, may allow us to re ne the analysis to understand the sort of Platonism 
we are dealing with. To begin with, the cosmology of the treatise is clear as to the strict 
dualistic scheme that lies behind its conception of the cosmos: the world is divided 
into two realms, namely the earthly and divine spheres. ExSoul reveals no trace of an 
intermediary realm, the astral region in which the planets or spheres are located and 
that was conceived of as the Demiurgical sphere in trichotomous schemes. 
The anthropology precisely correlates with the bipartite cosmological scheme. 
The human being consists of two differentiated parts, namely body and soul. Given 
the negative view of the material world, we cannot expect anything other than a very 
negative view of the material body as well, which is conceived of as the prison of 
the soul. ExSoul divides the latter into rational and irrational parts, but the loss of its 
original androgynous nature seems to re ect the debilitation of the soul’s intellectual 
faculty (its male part). As a result, the soul is trapped by the bonds of nature, and due 
to the rule of irrationality, the soul is now the victim both of sensory perception and 
the passions. However, even if dormant under the pressure of irrationality, rational-
ity is not completely lost: the mercy of the Father and His intervention will  nally 
ensure the recovery of her lost intellectual condition.
As in the cosmological views of the treatise, we  nd no trace of a third element 
in its anthropology. True, the appearance of the pneuma as the vivifying spirit that 
comes into the soul might seem to echo the Aristotelian conception of the extrin-
sic intellect that in man comes from without, as we know it from De generatione 
animalium78. However, the only passage that mentions it does not seem to consider 
77 See Plato, Phaedrus 245c 9 and Legges 896b 1.
78 ExSoul 134.1–2; Aristotle, De gen. an. 736B 27–29.
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pneuma as a differentiated part of the soul, but rather as the divine element by means 
of which God actualizes the soul’s dormant rational capacity. In this sense, the basic 
dualistic scheme is not challenged. 
The soteriology of the treatise is consistent both with the cosmological and the 
anthropological schemes. Consistent with its bipartite vision of the cosmos, the as-
cent of the soul and her resulting restoration to her original abode are automatic once 
the soul overcomes the earthly obstacles. There is no reference to other intermediary 
impediments that the soul has to deal with, such as the password owed to the archons 
who populate the planetary region, usually found in other Gnostic schemes. From an 
anthropological perspective, the recovery of the soul is automatic after the descent 
of her celestial half, which reactivates her rational capacity and remembrance of her 
origin. Consequently, there is no reference to the intellect whatsoever.
More important in assessing the kind of Platonism behind ExSoul is perhaps its 
reference to Gen 12:1 and its comparison with Philo’s interpretation: while the trea-
tise applies a clear bipartite interpretation to this verse of Genesis, Philo reveals a 
tripartite scheme. As already stated, the cosmological and anthropological dualism 
is clear in ExSoul’s explanation of ‘the father’s house’ as ‘the earthly father’. In a 
trichotomous scheme one would instead expect a closer association with the De-
miurgical sphere, the region where the soul has its origin and in which it remains, 
while the intellect continues its ascent to the transcendent realm. This is the reason 
why we cannot agree with Layton’s appealing hypothesis regarding the conception 
of the soul as a dirty garment. Given the absence in ExSoul of a third element that 
the soul would clothe, namely the intellect, we do not see how and why the soul 
could be considered as a ‘dirty garment’. Therefore it seems preferable to see it as a 
simple simile that describes the soul being cleansed of pollutants. Also indicative of 
its bipartite world-view is that ExSoul only attempts to explain two elements of the 
Biblical passage and not three: ‘your country’ in Genesis 12:1 remains unexplained. 
Was the allegorical interpretation of Genesis 12:1 not affected by the Pla-
tonism of ExSoul? Or did ExSoul simply adhere to the regular Christian dis-
sociation of the celestial and the earthly fathers, God and the devil? Certain 
parallel uses in Origen79 and Didymus the Blind80 might point in the latter 
79 See Origen, Selecta in Exodum 126. After quoting Gen 12:1 and af rming that the text has two 
interpretations, literal and spiritual, Origen appeals to its allegorical, deeper meaning. Allegorically 
interpreted, Gen 12:1 appeals to man to leave behind his earthly father, namely the devil. In this 
context he also quotes Psalm 44:11.
80 Didymus the Blind, In Zachariam II, 148, in which Didymus follows Origen, who associates the 
earthly father with the devil. After defending widows and orphans from general opprobrium by 
means of several Biblical quotations, Didymus resorts to the spiritual sense (| !). In his 
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direction81. Or are we simply dealing with different kinds of Platonism? After the 
exhaustive analysis of the world-view behind the treatise, however, it seems clear that 
ExSoul’s allegorical interpretation is consistent with the bipartite scheme that governs 
its cosmology, anthropology, psychology and soteriology. We might therefore con-
clude that ExSoul was in uenced by a kind of Platonism that was different to that of 
Philo. Whereas the latter interprets the passus according to a tripartite view of man cur-
rent in Middle-Platonic contexts under the in uence of the Peripatos, ExSoul remained 
faithful to traditional Platonism, free of Aristotelian in uences82. Behind ExSoul we 
might very well have a kind of purist Platonism which, as documented by Atticus, saw 
Aristotelian in uence as a betrayal of Plato’s heritage.
view, a widow has in a certain way rejected her ‘bad husband, who is no other than the devil’; with 
regard to an orphan, the father who procreated him in sin no longer exists. The reference to Gen 
12:1 and the quotation of Psalm 44:11 in the present context clearly show that in Didymus’ view 
they symbolize the rejection of the earthly realm and father. 
81 See M. SCOPELLO, ‘Les “Testimonia” dans le traité de “L’exégèse de l’âme” (Nag Hammadi, II, 
6)’, Revue de l’histoire des religions 191 (1977) 159–71, for the view that these similarities might 
indicate the existence of a  orilegium including these references.
82 On which see P. MERLAN, ‘The Later Academy and Platonism’, in A.H. ARMSTRONG (ed.), The Cam-
bridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, 1970) 53–83.
